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  OPINION 
________________     
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 David Roth was attempting to unload a railway 
tank car filled with sulfuric acid when its chemical 
contents exploded, spraying Roth across his face and 
chest and inflicting severe burns.  Roth brought suit, 
seeking damages for his personal injuries under the 
common law, but the District Court held that his lawsuit 
was preempted by the Hazardous Materials 
Transportation Act (―HMTA‖), 49 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5128.  
We agree and will therefore affirm. 
I 
 In the early 1970s, those who transported 
hazardous materials through interstate commerce were 
forced to navigate ―a patchwork of sometimes conflicting 
state regulations.‖  Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. 
Twp. of Lacey, 772 F.2d 1103, 1112–13 (3d Cir. 1985).  
The prevailing regulatory regime was fragmented and, to 
some, incoherent.  S. Rep. No. 93-1192, at 8 (1974) 
(explaining that ―the fragmentation of regulatory power 
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among the agencies dealing with the different modes of 
transportation blocks a coherent approach to the 
problem‖).  At the same time, the quantity of hazardous 
material moving across state lines was on the increase.  
S. Rep. No. 93-1192, at 7 (―The amount of hazardous 
material being transported in the United States increases 
every year.‖).  Predictably, accidents involving such 
materials were concomitantly on the rise.  S. Rep. No. 
93-1192, at 7 (―The increasing volume of dangerous 
products in commerce has brought with it an increasing 
number of accidents.‖).  To address these concerns, the 
Secretary of Transportation requested greater oversight 
capability.  See S. Rep. No. 93-1192, at 7. 
 Congress responded by enacting the HMTA in 
1975.  Its overriding purpose was to develop ―a uniform, 
national scheme of regulation regarding the 
transportation of hazardous materials.‖  CSX Transp., 
Inc. v. Williams, 406 F.3d 667, 674 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(Henderson, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); Chlorine Inst., Inc. v. Cal. Highway. Patrol, 29 
F.3d 495, 496 (9th Cir. 1994); Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm’n 
v. Harmon, 951 F.2d 1571, 1574 (10th Cir. 1991); Cent. 
Jersey Power, 772 F.2d at 1112–13; see also S. Rep. 93-
1192, at 1 (stating that passage of the HMTA was 
intended to ―draw[] the Federal Government‘s now-
fragmented regulatory and enforcement power over the 
movement of hazardous materials in commerce into one 
consolidated and coordinated effort under the direction of 
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the Secretary of Transportation‖).  Congress 
underscored—and expanded upon—this objective fifteen 
years later when it amended the HMTA and found, 
among other things, that: 
(3) many States and localities have enacted 
laws and regulations which vary from 
Federal laws and regulations pertaining to 
the transportation of hazardous materials, 
thereby creating the potential for 
unreasonable hazards in other jurisdictions 
and confounding shippers and carriers which 
attempt to comply with multiple and 
conflicting registration, permitting, routing, 
notification, and other regulatory 
requirements, 
(4) because of the potential risks to life, 
property, and the environment posed by 
unintentional releases of hazardous 
materials, consistency in laws and 
regulations governing the transportation of 
hazardous materials is necessary and 
desirable, 
(5) in order to achieve greater uniformity 
and to promote the public health, welfare, 
and safety at all levels, Federal standards for 
regulating the transportation of hazardous 
materials in intrastate, interstate, and foreign 
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commerce are necessary and desirable[.] 
Hazardous Materials Transportation Uniform Safety Act 
of 1990, Pub L. No. 101-615, § 2, 104 Stat. 3244, 3245 
(1990).  In 2005, Congress amended the HMTA again 
and re-adopted these findings.  Hazardous Materials 
Transportation Safety and Security Reauthorization Act 
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-59, § 7101, 119 Stat. 1144, 
1891 (2005). 
 The HMTA empowers the Secretary of 
Transportation to ―prescribe regulations for the safe 
transportation, including security, of hazardous materials 
in intrastate, interstate, and foreign commerce.‖  49 
U.S.C. § 5103(b)(1); see also Am. Chemistry Council v. 
Dep’t of Transp., 468 F.3d 810, 812 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
(describing this delegation as a ―broad mandate‖).  
Pursuant to this authority, the Department of 
Transportation (―DOT‖) promulgated a set of rules 
known as the Hazardous Materials Regulations 
(―HMR‖).  49 C.F.R. §§ 171–180.605.  These regulations 
apply to matters of ―transportation‖ in ―commerce.‖  49 
U.S.C. § 5103(b)(1); 49 C.F.R. § 171.1.  The HMTA 
defines ―transportation‖ as ―the movement of property 
and loading, unloading, or storage incidental to the 
movement.‖  49 U.S.C. § 5102(13).  ―Commerce‖ means, 
inter alia, ―trade or transportation in the jurisdiction of 
the United States . . . between a place in a State and a 
place outside of the State.‖  49 U.S.C. § 5102(1)(A).  The 
scheme erected by the HMTA/HMR is thus controlling 
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during the interstate movement of hazardous materials, 
and also at various stages before and after said 
movement.  See 49 C.F.R. § 171.1(a)–(c) (describing 
―pre-transportation functions,‖ ―transportation 
functions,‖ and instances of ―storage incidental to 
movement‖).    
Where applicable, the HMR is comprehensive: it 
sets forth, for example, each substance or material 
considered to be ―hazardous‖; governs the transport of 
such material by aircraft, railcar, vessel, and motor 
vehicle; describes requirements for packaging, marking, 
labeling, declaring, and registering hazardous materials; 
and advances a series of training and security 
requirements for those who come into contact with 
hazardous substances.  Failure to comply with these 
provisions can result in an array of administrative 
sanctions, civil penalties, and, under certain 
circumstances, criminal punishment.  See 49 U.S.C. §§ 
5121–24. 
Sulfuric acid is a ―hazardous material.‖  49 C.F.R. 
§ 172.101.  Accordingly, railway tank cars carrying the 
chemical must adhere to design specifications approved 
by the DOT.  49 C.F.R. § 173.242(a).  Tank cars must be 
mounted to a railcar structure in a specified manner.  49 
C.F.R. §§ 179.10–179.11.  Tank car volume and weight 
capacity are spelled out.  49 C.F.R. § 179.13.  Most tank 
car models must satisfy DOT standards for thermal 
resistance.  49 C.F.R. § 179.18.  Modifications to the 
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design features set forth in the HMR are prohibited 
absent written authorization from the DOT.  49 C.F.R. §§ 
179.3–179.4.   
Defendant Norfalco transported sulfuric acid using 
model 111AW non-pressure tank cars.  The HMR 
governs the 111AW‘s shape, 49 C.F.R. § 179.200-3, the 
thickness of the plates used to construct the car, § 
179.200-6, its expansion capacity, § 179.200-14, the 
method for applying attachments to the tank car structure, 
§ 179.200-19, the size, shape, and appearance of plugs 
used to cap tank car openings, § 179.200-21, and the 
presence, quantity, and application of insulating 
materials, § 179.200-4.  Each 111AW tank car must also 
undergo pressure testing to ensure there is no ―leakage or 
evidence of distress.‖  49 C.F.R. § 179.200-22.  It is 
undisputed that Norfalco fully complied with the HMR 
requirements for model 111AW tank cars. 
The HMR sets forth various fittings suitable for 
tank car installation.  When so installed, ―[g]auging 
devices, top loading and unloading devices, venting and 
air inlet devices‖ must be approved for use by the 
Association of American Railroads (―AAR‖), an industry 
standard-setting organization.  49 C.F.R. § 179.200-16; 
49 C.F.R. § 179.2 (defining ―approved‖ under Part 179).  
The AAR, in turn, publishes a ―Manual of Standards and 
Recommended Practices,‖ one chapter of which details 
design and maintenance criteria for the fittings identified 
above.  Several specifications in this chapter pertain to 
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devices installed on sulfuric acid-bearing cars.  The 
parties agree that Norfalco‘s tank cars complied with 
AAR criteria concerning gauging devices, top loading 
and unloading devices, venting and air inlet devices. 
Most tank cars must also be equipped with agency-
approved pressure relief devices.  See 49 C.F.R. § 
179.15.  Such instruments must permit ―sufficient flow 
capacity to prevent pressure build-up in the tank.‖  49 
C.F.R. § 179.15(a).  Flow capacity requirements are set 
forth in the AAR Manual of Standards and 
Recommended Practices.  49 C.F.R. § 179.15(b).  
Furthermore, the HMR dictates precise technical settings 
according to which pressure relief devices must be 
reclosed following use, 49 C.F.R. § 179.15(b), and 
imposes testing standards to ensure that each instrument 
satisfies applicable criteria before it is put to use in 
transport, 49 C.F.R. § 179.200-23.  The parties agree that 
Norfalco complied in full with the HMR requirements for 
pressure relief devices.  Indeed, there is not a single 
provision in the HMTA or HMR with which Norfalco 
failed to comply. 
II 
 P.H. Glatfelter Company is a paper manufacturer 
based in York, Pennsylvania.  Its manufacturing process 
requires large quantities of sulfuric acid—approximately 
40,000 pounds per day—which it uses to bleach wood 
pulp.  In 2004, Glatfelter purchased nearly all the sulfuric 
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acid it needed from Norfalco, North America‘s largest 
supplier of the chemical.  Norfalco would then deliver 
the sulfuric acid by rail directly to Glatfelter‘s 
Pennsylvania mill. 
 Roth was employed by Glatfelter as a ―chemical 
unloader.‖  His primary responsibility, as his job title 
suggests, was to unload sulfuric acid from the tank cars 
sent by Norfalco.  Before he could safely do so, however, 
Roth was required to depressurize each car.  This process 
was simple enough: Roth explained in a deposition that 
he first removed a cap covering an ―air inlet‖ located on 
the tank car and then opened something called the 
―Jamesbury valve.‖  At this point, air began to exit the 
tank car through the uncapped air inlet.  Roth knew the 
tank car was depressurized when he could no longer hear 
or feel air escaping from the inlet. 
 To unload the depressurized tank car of its 
chemical contents, Roth opened a second inlet into which 
he inserted a rod-like device called an ―elbow pipe.‖  On 
the opposite end of the elbow pipe, Roth attached a 
rubber hose, called the ―acid hose.‖  The acid hose ran to 
a nearby ―acid storage tank.‖  Roth had to siphon the 
sulfuric acid out of the tank car through the acid hose by 
pumping air into the tank car through the first air inlet; 
the incoming air pushed sulfuric acid out of the tank car 
through the second air inlet and into the acid hose, where 
it flowed into the storage tank.  On average, it took 




 On August 11, 2004, Roth was attempting to 
unload a tank car of sulfuric acid when he encountered an 
unidentified mechanical difficulty.  Because the source of 
the complication was not apparent, Roth‘s supervisor 
instructed him to ―deactivate‖ the unloading process and 
move on to another tank car.  Roth complied, but he did 
not remove the elbow pipe from the partially-unloaded 
car.  Two days later, Roth was told to detach the pipe.  
As he did so, acid began ―flying out‖ of the air inlet, 
spraying Roth‘s face and chest and causing severe burns.  
Roth later explained that he had not attempted to 
depressurize the tank car before removing the elbow pipe 
because he believed—mistakenly, as it turned out—that  
the car was ―already depressurized.‖ 
 Roth invoked diversity jurisdiction and filed a 
complaint in the District Court asserting negligence, 
strict liability, products liability, and breach of warranty 
claims.  His theory of the case was the stuff of basic tort 
law: Norfalco had a duty to design its tank cars to ensure 
they were safe for those who unloaded them.  This duty 
required Norfalco to equip its cars with a safety valve 
that would have allowed a chemical unloader like Roth to 
control the rate at which sulfuric acid was discharged.  In 
addition, Norfalco had a duty to equip its tank cars with a 
pressure gauge, whose presence would have alerted Roth 
of the need to depressurize the car before unloading it.  
The absence of both safety devices, according to Roth, 
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meant that Norfalco had been negligent.  Roth also 
argued that Norfalco warranted that its cars were 
designed in a reasonably safe manner, that Norfalco‘s 
tank cars were ultrahazardous, and that, given the 
absence of a safety valve and pressure gauge, sulfuric 
acid could not be removed from the cars in a safe and 
prudent manner.  
 The District Court granted summary judgment in 
favor of Norfalco.  The Court first determined that Roth‘s 
common law negligence, products liability, and breach of 
warranty claims are expressly preempted by the HMTA.  
It then held that Roth‘s strict liability claim, while not 
preempted, nonetheless failed because unloading sulfuric 
acid from a tank car is not an ―abnormally dangerous 
activity.‖  Roth appeals this decision, attacking both of 
the District Court‘s conclusions.  We have jurisdiction to 
entertain his appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
III 
 We subject a grant of summary judgment to 
plenary review.  Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 
F.3d 822, 826 (3d Cir. 2011).  Under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is appropriate ―if 
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.‖  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  Material facts 
are those ―that could affect the outcome‖ of the 
proceeding, and ―a dispute about a material fact is 
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‗genuine‘ if the evidence is sufficient to permit a 
reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving 
party.‖  Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 181 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 
U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).  In conducting our inquiry, we 
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
nonmovant and draw all reasonable inferences in that 
party‘s favor.  Spence v. ESAB Group, Inc., 623 F.3d 
212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010).  Here, the District Court‘s 
preemption and strict liability determinations were based 
on questions of law; we review those dispositions de 
novo.  Deweese v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), 
590 F.3d 239, 244 n.8 (3d Cir. 2009). 
IV 
 The Constitution‘s Supremacy Clause elevates 
federal law above that of the states, U.S. Const. art. VI, 
cl. 2, providing Congress with ―the power ‗to preempt 
state legislation if it so intends,‘‖ Deweese, 590 F.3d at 
245 (quoting Hi Tech Transp., LLC v. N.J. Dep’t of 
Envtl. Prot., 382 F.3d 295, 302 (3d Cir. 2004)).  
Preemption comes in three forms: express preemption, 
field preemption, and implied conflict preemption.  
Farina v. Nokia, Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 116 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(citing Hillsborough Cnty., Fla. v. Automated Med. 
Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985)).  Express 
preemption occurs when a federal law ―contains language 
so requiring.‖  Bruesewitz v. Wyeth Inc., 561 F.3d 233, 
239 (3d Cir. 2009), aff’d, ---U.S.---, 131 S. Ct. 1068 
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(2011).  The congressional enactment, in other words, 
must be explicit about its preemptive effects.  Deweese, 
590 F.3d at 247 n.10; St. Thomas-St. John Hotel & 
Tourism Ass’n v. Gov’t of the Virgin Islands, 218 F.3d 
232, 238 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining that express 
preemption ―arises when there is an explicit statutory 
command that state law be displaced‖).  Field preemption 
arises by implication when Congress regulates a domain 
so pervasively that it leaves no room for state regulation.  
See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 111 (2000).  
Finally, implied conflict preemption applies either where 
it is impossible to comply with both state and federal 
requirements, Hillsborough Cnty., 471 U.S. at 713, or 
―where state law stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress,‖ Kurns v. A.W. Chesterton Inc., 
620 F.3d 392, 395–96 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 Section 5125 of the HMTA contains a multi-
pronged preemption provision that, when applicable, 
displaces an array of state and local law.  49 U.S.C. § 
5125.  Under subsection (a)(1), a non-federal regulation 
is preempted if it ―is not possible‖ to comply with both 
the HMTA and the non-federal requirement.  Subsection 
(a)(2) preempts a non-federal requirement that ―is an 
obstacle to accomplishing and carrying out . . . a 
regulation prescribed under [the HMTA].‖  Neither of 
these provisions is applicable to the case at hand. 
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 Section 5125(b)(1) of the HMTA contains an 
express preemption provision, which states, 
[U]nless authorized by another law of the 
United States, a law, regulation, order, or 
other requirement of a State, political 
subdivision of a State, or Indian tribe about 
any of the following subjects, that is not 
substantively the same as a provision of this 
chapter, a regulation prescribed under this 
chapter, or a hazardous materials 
transportation security regulation or 
directive issued by the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, is preempted. 
This section then sets forth five subject areas that fall 
within the provision‘s preemptive scope (i.e., the 
―following subjects,‖ reference above): 
(A) the designation, description, and 
classification of hazardous material. 
(B) the packing, repacking, handling, 
labeling, marking, and placarding of 
hazardous material. 
(C) the preparation, execution, and use of 
shipping documents related to hazardous 
material and requirements related to the 




(D) the written notification, recording, and 
reporting of the unintentional release in 
transportation of hazardous material. 
(E) the designing, manufacturing, 
fabricating, inspecting, marking, 
maintaining, reconditioning, repairing, or 
testing a package, container, or packaging 
component that is represented, marked, 
certified, or sold as qualified for use in 
transporting hazardous material in 
commerce. 
49 U.S.C. § 5125(b)(1)(A)–(E). 
 It is obvious from the face of the statute that § 
5125(b)(1) expressly preempts non-federal requirements 
that relate to, or are ―about,‖ the five subject areas set 
forth in § 5125(b)(1)(A)–(E).  Our interpretive task does 
not end here, however, for even where an express 
preemption provision is at issue, we must nevertheless 
―identify the domain expressly pre-empted‖ by the 
provision.  Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484 
(1996) (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 
U.S. 504, 517 (1992)); see also Farina, 625 F.3d at 118 
(explaining that a reviewing court must pinpoint ―the 
scope of the preemption provision‖).  We do so guided 
by two precepts.  ―First, ‗the purpose of Congress is the 
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ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.‘‖  Wyeth 
v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194 (2009) 
(quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485).  Second, we 
assume ―‗that the historic police powers of the States 
[are] not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that 
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.‘‖  Id. at 
1194–95 (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485).  This 
second guiding principle is often referred to as a 
―presumption against preemption,‖ Deweese, 590 F.3d at 
246 (citing Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516), and it holds even 
where an express preemption provision is in play, 
Bruesewitz, 561 F.3d at 240; see also Bates v. Dow 
Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) (stating that 
―Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes 
of action‖ (internal quotation omitted)); but see Cuomo v. 
Clearing House Ass’n, L.L.C., --- U.S. ---, 129 S. Ct. 
2710, 2732 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (collecting 
view of four justices that the presumption against 
preemption does not apply when interpreting the scope of 
an express preemption provision).  If the preemptive 
scope of the statute is clear, however, ―the presumption 
against preemption can be overcome.‖  Bruesewitz, 561 
F.3d at 240. 
 We begin, then, by seeking to discern Congress‘ 
intent.  The plain wording of the preemption provision is 
of paramount importance, for this ―necessarily contains 
the best evidence of Congress‘ pre-emptive intent.‖  
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, No. 09-115, slip. op. 
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at 9 (U.S. May 26, 2011) (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. 
Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993)).  We may also 
consider the ―structure and purpose of the statute as a 
whole,‖ Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 486 (internal quotation 
marks omitted), the larger regulatory scheme, Bruesewitz, 
561 F.3d at 243, and, where uncertainty persists, the 
statute‘s legislative history, Deweese, 590 F.3d at 247; 
Bruesewitz, 561 F.3d at 244 (explaining that ―resort to 
legislative history is appropriate ‗when necessary to 
interpret ambiguous statutory text‘‖ (quoting BedRoc 
Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 187 n.8 (2004) 
(plurality opinion))). 
 On its face, § 5125(b)(1) is an expansive 
preemption provision.  Am. Chemistry Council, 468 F.3d 
at 817 (describing § 5125(b)(1) as a ―broader preemption 
[provision] with respect to state or local efforts to 
regulate specific, enumerated subjects‖).  It preempts all 
non-federal laws, regulations, orders, or requirements 
that are ―not substantively the same as‖ corresponding 
federal regulations.  Our threshold concern, then, is to 
identify the contours of the non-federal law, regulation, 
order, or requirement at issue in the case.  Once we have 
done so, we must ascertain (1) whether § 5125(b)(1) 
applies to the non-federal law, regulation, order, or 
requirement we have identified, and (2) whether the non-
federal requirement is ―substantively the same as‖ the 
conditions imposed by federal hazardous materials law. 
 What, then, are the contours of the non-federal 
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law, regulation, order, or requirement invoked by Roth?  
Although his complaint runs through the standard 
catalogue of common law tort actions—negligence, strict 
liability, products liability, and breach of warranty—Roth 
is, at bottom, claiming that Norfalco had a common law 
duty to design a safer tank car.  He alleges in his 
complaint, for example, that the ―railroad tank cars 
[were] dangerous and defective because [they] did not 
contain components which would indicate pressure . . . or 
valves . . . which would prevent acid from spraying onto 
people . . . who were unloading‖ the cars.  He claims that 
the unloading process was ―ultrahazardous‖ because the 
tank cars lacked a safety valve and pressure gauge.  He 
contends that Norfalco had a duty to ―plac[e] valves . . . 
on the pipes to prevent acid from spraying onto 
[unloaders],‖ and to ―plac[e] gauges on the car which 
would inform [an unloader] of the pressure in the car.‖  
And he argues that Norfalco warranted that a chemical 
unloader could safely remove sulfuric acid from its tank 
cars.  The sum of these contentions, though pleaded 
under ostensibly distinct common law theories, is the 
same: Roth seeks to impose a design requirement that, if 
successful, would require Norfalco to install an 
additional safety valve and pressure gauge on each of its 
tank cars.  See Kurns, 620 F.3d at 398 n.8 (focusing on 
the ―gravamen‖ of the claim rather than the common law 
label appended to it by the plaintiffs).  Roth‘s common 
law claims—including his claim of strict liability—thus 
constitute ―non-federal requirement[s]‖ under the 
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HMTA.  See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 324 (holding that a 
statute‘s ―reference to a State‘s ‗requirements‘ includes 
its common-law duties‖); Premium Mortg. Corp. v. 
Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 583 F.3d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 
2009) (stating that ―obligations that take the form of 
common-law rules‖ are ―easily encompass[ed]‖ by a 
provision that preempts state ―requirement[s]‖). 
We next turn to whether § 5125(b)(1) applies to 
the design requirement claim raised by Roth.  Section 
5125(b)(1)(A)–(E) describes five transport-related 
covered subjects.  The express preemption provision 
covers any non-federal requirement ―about‖ one of these 
five covered subjects.  Roth‘s design requirement falls 
squarely within the subject area set forth in § 
5125(b)(1)(E): it concerns the ―design[]‖ of a ―package, 
container, or packaging component that is . . . qualified 
for use in transporting hazardous materials in 
commerce.‖  Roth is, after all, attempting to impose a 
design requirement on a chemical tank car, which is 
considered a package, container, or packaging 
component that is approved for use in transporting 
sulfuric acid by rail.  Design requirements of a hazardous 
material package, container, or packaging component are 
the exclusive domain of the HMTA.  Roth does not 
dispute this point; in fact, his counsel acknowledged at 
oral argument that the proposed design requirement fell 
within § 5125(b)(1)(E). 
Lastly, we ask whether the tank car design 
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requirement urged upon us is ―substantively the same as‖ 
the HMR design requirements for packages, containers, 
or packaging components qualified for use in 
transporting hazardous materials in commerce.  It quite 
clearly is not.  A non-federal requirement is ―not 
substantively the same‖ unless it ―conforms in every 
significant respect to the Federal requirement.‖  49 
C.F.R. § 107.202(d); see also H.R. Rep. No. 101-444, at 
24 (1990) (―[I]t should be noted that states may maintain 
and enforce laws, regulations, rules, standards or orders 
that are the same as their Federal counterparts.‖).  Roth‘s 
design requirement would impose conditions beyond 
those imposed by the HMR and, therefore, it does not 
conform in every significant respect to the federal 
regulatory scheme.  49 C.F.R. § 107.202(d); see Chlorine 
Inst., 29 F.3d at 496 (concluding that state regulation was 
―not substantively the same as‖ the relevant HMR 
requirement when it imposed a condition not required by 
federal regulation). 
 Roth‘s common law claims, which seek to impose 
design requirements upon a package, container, or 
packaging component used to transport hazardous 
materials in commerce, are expressly preempted under 
the plain meaning of § 5125(b)(1).  Because the text of 
the provision is clear, we need go no further to determine 
the scope of Congress‘ preemptive intent.  Nonetheless, 
the structure of the HMTA, as well as the purposes 
underlying its enactment, lend additional support to our 
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conclusion.  See Bruesewitz, --- U.S. ---, 131 S. Ct. at 
1078–79 (looking to structure and purpose of statute to 
bolster conclusion regarding preemptive scope even 
when text was clear).   
The overriding aim of the HMTA, as explained 
above, was to restructure a national environment in 
which ―many States and localities ha[d] enacted laws and 
regulations [that] var[ied] from Federal laws and 
regulations pertaining to the transportation of hazardous 
materials, thereby . . . confounding carriers . . . 
attempt[ing] to comply with multiple and conflicting . . . 
regulatory requirements.‖  Hazardous Materials 
Transportation Uniform Safety Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-615, § 2, 104 Stat. 3244, 3245 (1990).  To rectify 
this hodgepodge of jurisdictional conflicts, Congress 
sought to establish ―a uniform, national scheme of 
regulation regarding the transportation of hazardous 
materials.‖  CSX Transp., 406 F.3d at 674 (Henderson, J., 
concurring).  The resulting regulatory framework is 
detailed and comprehensive, and it devotes significant 
attention to, inter alia, the packages, containers, and 
packaging components that routinely move across state 
lines.  Chemical tank cars, which serve as bulk containers 
for hazardous materials, are subject to their own unique 
set of detailed specifications.  This is exactly as one 
would expect given the motivation underlying the 
HMTA; were each state or locality permitted to impose 
its own tank car design requirements, carriers would be 
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faced with a ―patchwork‖ of multiple and potentially 
conflicting jurisdictional mandates, with resulting 
confusion over how to comply.  See Kurns, 620 F.3d at 
398 (holding that the Locomotive Inspection Act, 49 
U.S.C. § 20701 et seq., preempted state common law tort 
claims when Congress evinced a clear goal of uniform 
railroad equipment regulation, and explaining that ―[i]f 
each state had its own standards for liability for railroad 
manufacturers, equipment would have to be designed so 
that it could be changed to fit these standards as the trains 
crossed state lines, or adhere to the standard of the most 
restrictive states‖). 
The HMTA preemption provision was, and is, the 
linchpin in Congress‘ efforts to impose nationwide 
regulatory uniformity.  Harmon, 951 F.2d at 1581 (―[I]n 
enacting new preemption standards, Congress expressly 
contemplated that the Secretary would employ his 
powers to achieve safety by enhancing uniformity in the 
regulation of hazardous materials transportation.‖); see 
also CSX Transp., 406 F.3d at 674 (Henderson, J., 
concurring) (―It was to promote this goal of uniform 
safety regulation by the federal agencies that the 
Congress enacted the HMTA preemption provision.‖); 
Jersey Cent. Power, 772 F.2d at 1113 (―Congress 
included this [preemption] provision to preclude a 
multiplicity of State and local regulations and the 
potential for varying as well as conflicting regulations in 
the area of hazardous materials transportation.‖ (internal 
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quotation marks omitted)).  Indeed, when it was initially 
enacted, the HMTA preemption clause contained only a 
general inconsistency standard—state or local 
―requirement[s]‖ were preempted if ―inconsistent‖ with 
federal regulations.  Transportation Safety Act of 1974, 
Pub. L. 93-633, § 112, 88 Stat. 2156.  This, thought the 
Senate Committee on Commerce, would serve ―to 
preclude a multiplicity of State and local regulations and 
the potential for varying as well as conflicting regulations 
in the area of hazardous materials transportation.‖  S. 
Rep. No. 93-1192, at 37.  The Committee was mistaken.  
Non-federal requirements continued to proliferate over 
the next two decades, leading Congress to overhaul—and 
significantly expand—the HMTA‘s preemptive scope. 
Today there are three separate sections in § 5125 
that mandate preemption.  Two continue to operate 
according to a rough consistency standard.  See 49 U.S.C. 
§ 5125(a)(1)–(2).  The third, upon which we focus here, 
preempts expressly so long as a covered subject is in 
play.  49 U.S.C. § 5125(b)(1).  The Secretary of 
Transportation is also authorized to make preemption 
determinations, 49 U.S.C. § 5125(d), and localities may 
petition for a preemption waiver in order to avoid the 
HMTA‘s preemptive sweep, 49 U.S.C. § 5125(e). 
Absent from the HMTA preemption provision, 
however, is a savings clause exempting common law 
requirements from the bundle of those non-federal laws 
and regulations displaced by the federal scheme.  This is 
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important, for in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., the Supreme 
Court held that unless there is some indication to the 
contrary, ―reference [by a preemption clause] to a State‘s 
‗requirements‘ includes its common-law duties.‖  552 
U.S. at 324.  Congress may displace this default 
condition by tempering a preemption provision with a 
savings clause.  See Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., 
Inc., --- U.S. ---, 131 S. Ct. 1131, 1135–36 (2011); Geier 
v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 868–69 
(2000).  Thus, in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 
Inc., the Court held that state common law requirements 
were not preempted by a federal motor vehicle regulation 
that expressly preempted any non-federal safety standard 
―not identical to the Federal standard.‖  529 U.S. at 864 
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d)).  The reason, said the 
Court, lay in the presence of a savings clause that read, 
―[c]ompliance with‖ a federal safety standard ―does not 
exempt any person from any liability under common 
law.‖  Id. at 868.  By including such a clause, Congress 
manifested an intent not to displace common law claims.  
Id.  In contrast, there is nothing in the HMTA to indicate 
that Congress did not wish to preempt state common law 
requirements.  We are thus left with a robust preemption 
provision that leaves little, if any, room for non-federal 
regulation. 
In sum, the structure and purpose of the HMTA 
confirms what the text of § 5125(b)(1) makes plain: the 
HMTA preempts state common law claims that, if 
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successful, would impose design requirements upon a 
package or container qualified for use in transporting 
hazardous materials in commerce.  Each of Roth‘s 
common law claims is therefore expressly preempted.  
Our holding is, in this respect, more expansive than that 
of the District Court, which concluded that the claim for 
strict liability was not displaced by the HMTA.  But this 
claim, however branded, would lead to results precluded 
by federal law.  Thus, it is not outside § 5125(b)(1)‘s 
preemptive scope.  
Roth attempts to avoid this result by questioning 
the very applicability of the HMTA to the case at bar.  He 
contends that the statute reaches only to matters of 
―transport‖ in ―commerce,‖ a limitation that does not 
encompass the accident at issue here.  In other words, 
Roth claims that when a consignee such as Glatfelter (or 
its employee) unloads a hazardous material that has 
reached its final destination, the HMTA does not apply 
because the act of unloading is not ―transport‖ in 
―commerce.‖  And the HMTA, Roth argues, has nothing 
to say about such non-transport activities. 
The HMTA defines ―transport‖ as ―the movement 
of property, and loading, unloading, or storage incidental 
to the movement.‖  49 U.S.C. § 5102(13).  At the time 
Roth was injured, the phrase ―loading, unloading, or 
storage incidental to the movement‖ was not defined.  
The DOT has subsequently promulgated a final rule 
defining this phrase.  ―Unloading incidental to 
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movement‖ is now taken to mean, inter alia, ―emptying a 
hazardous material from the bulk packaging after the 
hazardous material has been delivered to the consignee 
when performed by carrier personnel or in the presence 
of carrier personnel.‖  49 C.F.R. § 171.1(c)(3) (emphasis 
added).  In contrast, ―unloading incidental to movement‖ 
does not include 
[u]nloading of a hazardous material from a 
transport vehicle or a bulk packaging 
performed by a person employed by or 
working under contract to the consignee 
following delivery of the hazardous material 
by the carrier to its destination and departure 
from the consignee‘s premises of the 
carrier‘s personnel . . . . 
49 C.F.R. § 171.1(d)(2).  Roth claims that he falls within 
this carve-out, for at the time of his injury, he was an 
employee of a consignee (Glatfelter) unloading sulfuric 
acid from a bulk packaging (the tank car) following 
delivery by the carrier (Norfalco) and departure of the 
carrier‘s employees.  This, according to Roth, places the 
circumstances surrounding his accident, and any common 
law claims arising therefrom, outside the regulatory 
scheme erected by the HMTA. 
 Roth‘s theory is creative but wrong.  In his haste to 
invoke the quoted portions of the HMR, Roth forgets that 
we need not look beyond the text of a statute unless its 
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meaning is ambiguous.  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984); Lee v. 
Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2004).  When the 
meaning of statutory text is plain, our inquiry is at an 
end.  Restrepo v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 617 
F.3d 787, 792 (3d Cir. 2010); Steele v. Blackman, 236 
F.3d 130, 133 (3d Cir. 2001).  Here, the statute and its 
applicability could not be more clear.  Roth seeks to 
impose a tank car design requirement.  Section 
5125(b)(1) expressly preempts any common law 
requirement ―about‖ the design of a ―package, container, 
or packaging component . . . qualified for use in 
transporting hazardous materials in commerce.‖  Roth 
concedes that Norfalco‘s tank cars are containers 
qualified for use in transporting hazardous materials in 
commerce.  Thus, the HMTA plainly encompasses 
Roth‘s common law claims.  It is irrelevant what Roth 
was doing at the precise moment of his injury.  This only 
makes sense, for it cannot be the case that the 
comprehensive design requirements erected by the 
HMTA cease to govern simply because the tank car was 
emptied of its contents days after its delivery.  The tank 
car is, at all times, a container qualified for use in 
transporting hazardous materials.  The proposed design 
requirement is expressly preempted. 
V 
 For the reasons set forth above, we hold that the 
common law claims raised by Roth are expressly 
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preempted by the HMTA.  Accordingly, we will affirm 
the order of the District Court granting summary 
judgment in favor of Norfalco.   
